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comment. References in publications to Discussion
Papers should be cleared with the author to protect
the tentative character of these papers.

This paper discusses the growth and development of the internation al
capital market during the past decade• considers whether it can be said
that a genuine internation al capital market now exists, and discusses the

advantages and disadvantag es of one integrated capital market transcendin g
national economies.

"Capital markets" involve the lllObiliz.atio n of savings

by those who want or aTe willing to accept financial claims, for invest

ment (or consumption) by o1hem who are willing to accept financial liabili
ties or share their equity.

Capital markets are usually distinguish ed from

"money markets" by the maturity of the claims that are traded there, the
capital market referring to transaction s in claims with maturities in ex
cess (definition ally) of one year, and usually in excess of five years, al
though any clear distinction between the two .must be arbitrary, for
these markets may be, and typically are, closely related.

Nedium-term

bank lending, for example, involves maturities in excess of one year but
o-.dinarily does not give rise to marketable securities.
seve.ul _ge.os~&Ph.ica.lly--dis-ti.a.ct----capita.l-.-.markets. ..can be a.aid to be

integrated -- that is, effectively one market -- to the extent that a
significant number of savers do not distinguish among claims on the basis
of the geographica l location of the borrower.

In the internation al con.text,

this means that a significant number of savers do hot distinguish among
borrowers on the basis of nationality . This failure to distinguish must in~
elude, of course, both the willingness to accept claims on foreigners and
the ability to do so, the latter implying an absence of balance-of-p ayment~
and other restriction s against foreign investment.
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The extent to which there can be said to be an Atlantic capital market.
encompassing Canada, the United States, and many or most of the countries
of western Europe, can be approached empirically from two angles. We can
ask about the absolute and relative volume of long-term financial trans
actions crossing national boundaries and about the nationality and other
characteristics of the borrowers and lenders. Or we can apply the economi
cally more meaningful test of the extent to which bond yields and share
prices have been brought into harmony.

One market implies one price for

identical goods or claims, and similar prices for similar goods or claims.
A genuine Atlantic capital market would therefore imply similar interest
rates or yields for financial claims of similar risk and liquidity.

The

next two sections of this paper offer some sketchy evidence on both of these
approaches.

Following this evidence, I will draw some implications for

economic policy of the tendency toward one market, and offer an assessment
of the advantages and disadva~tages at the prce2.n~ time of a unified capital
market spanning national boundaries.

1.

The Size and Growth of International Capital Mc,,,ements
The rapid growth in foreign bond flotations during the decade of the

sixties has been a source of universal astonishment. From barely more than
$200 million in 1958 (close to $400 million if the United Kingdom is in
cluded), foreign bond issues in Europe grew to over $4.7 billion in 1968,
a compound growth rate of nearly 30 percent a year. The growth is far less
dramatic, but still dramatic, if the United States market is included: total
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foreign bond issues on both sides of the Atlantic rose from $1.5 billion in
1958 to $6.3 billion in 19681 , a fourfold increase (Table 1).

A distinction

may be drawn between foreign bonds issued in national markets, denominated'in
the national currency of the market in which it is floated, and "international"
bond issues, which are denominated in a currency (usually U.S. dollars but also
German marks,

two or more currencies, and units of account) different from

that of the country(ies) in which it is floated.

2

The overwhelming bulk of the long-term foreign borrowing in the United
States is by Canadians, although Japan, Israel, the World Bank, and (before
the imposition of the interest equalization tax in 1963) several European countries
have also been important borrowers.

U.S. corporations and their subsidiaries

have been the single most important group of borrowers in European markets,
accounting for nearly half of all new issues (many of them convertible bonds)
in 1968.

Non-American corporations accounted for nearly a quarter of the

borrowing, and governmental bodies and international institutions for the
remainder.

Characterizing the lenders is more difficult, since it is not

known who ultimately purchases these bonds.

In the United States, insurance

companies and pension funds provide a steady source of demand for new bond
issues.

In the European market, individuals and family trusts are relatively

1. It might be noted in passing that recent levels compare favorably
in absolute magnitude to the average annual $2.0 billion in foreign bonds
issued in Europe and the United States during 1924-28, the alleged heyday
of the international capital market.
2. Foreign bonds denominated in German marks are considered "inter
national" bonds after March 1964, even when floated on the German market,
since they were exempt from the coupon tax levied on interest payments to
foreign holders of German bonds and hence had lower yields than German
bonds floated on the domestic market.
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Table 1
Foreign Bond Issuesa, 1958-1968

($ million)

Foreign Issues on Domestic Markets
Europeanb
United States

International
Issuesb

Total

1958

1138

302

82

1522

1959

802

337

31

1170

1960

636

393

29

1058

1961

558

559

79

1196

1962

1185

430

1963

1414

426

119

1958

1964

1191

838

2293

1965

1532

263
264c

1192

2989

1966

1317

550c

1155

3021

1967

1619d

404c

2002

4025

196.8

1576d

1185c

3517

6278

1615

a

Including private placements and convertible bonds

b

Foreign bonds issued in Germany after imposition of the 25 percent_
coupon tax on German bonds in March 1964 are treated as international
issues, since they are exempt from the tax.
Including the Canadian market

c

d E~cludes portion purchased by foreigners
Sources:

1958-1966: OECD, Capital Markets Study, Vol. III, Functioning of
Capital Markets,(Paris, OECD, 1968), p. 717; 1967-1968: Department
of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, and Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company, World Financial Markets.
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more important (leading to correspondingly higher selling costs for the
"retail" market).' It has been estimated for the mid-sixties that about half
the purchas_es of foreign bonds issued in Europe were by banks and trusts in
Switzerland, acting on behalf of customers from all over the world; another
20 percent of the funds came from other continental European countries.

1

Over three-quarters of the international bond issues, narrowly defined,
were denominated in U.S. dollars, and therefore over two-thirds of total
outside the United States
foreign bond issues/were so denominated. Like a language, a currency is

useful in proportion to the number of people who use it. By using a connnon
currency, the market is widened and the potential liquidity of financial

claims is increased -- potential since this liquidity depends on the de
velopment of secondary markets where securities are bought and sold after
issue and before maturity. (Secondary markets in Europe have developed more
slowly than the new issues market.)During 1968 and 1969 use of the German
mark became more prominent, as the German monetary authorities deliberately
reduced interest rates and took other steps to encourage the export of
capital, making DM-denominated bonds less costly to borrowers than dollardenominated ones.

2

Foreign and international bond issues have grown rapidly relative to
the total activity on the various national capital markets, as well as in
absolute volume.

Comparable measures are difficult to achieve, but on the

1. David Williams, "Foreign Currency Issues in European Security
Markets," IMF Staff Papers, May 1967, p. 61.
2. Expectations of a future revaluation of the mark also helped
lower coupon rates on DM-denominated bonds.
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basis of total net new bond issues on the eight major European capital markets
plus the United States, as computed by the OECD, the share of foreign and
international bond issues rose from

five percent in 1960 toeleven
,
percent

in 1965 and to an estimated fourteen percent in 1968. 1
Equity shares comprise another part of the capital market.

Here one

must turn to the secondary market for relevant information, since it is far
more important, relative to new issues, than is the

case for bonds.

Until

1967 and 1968, net movements of funds between countries on account of pur
chases of stocks (excluding direct investment, aimed at management control)
was rather small,

Americans added very little to their holdings

of foreign stocks during the sixties, while the British engaged in large
scale net liquidation of their foreign share holdings.

Net foreign purchases

of American stocks rose sharply after the mid-sixties, however~ from $220
million in 1963 to nearly $2.3 billion in 1968, with purchases from Europe
and Canada accounting for the bulk of them.

Mutual funds spread rapidly in

the late sixties, especially in Germany and Italy, and many•of these specialized
in the purchase of foreign -- mainly American -- stocks.
From the viewpoint of the integration of capital markets, however, it
is gross rather than net transactions that count.
even when net transactions were small.

These have been substantial,

In 1968, for instance, foreigners

bought $t3.l billion in American stocks, and sold$10.8 billion, over six
times the levels of 1960;

American purchases of foreign stocks (except for

1. OECD, Capital Markets Study, op. cit., Statistical Annex,
pp. 122-23, and the sources there citecf:"
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dealers, generally subject to the interest equalization tax of 15 percent)
amounted to $1.,6 billion in 1968, while sales came to $1.2 billion, both
over

double the levels of 1960.

These sums are of course small relative

to the total gross value of stock sales ($125 billion on the New York Stock
Exchange alone in 1968).

But here, as elsewhere in economics, it is the

marginal buyer that counts. The question, therefore, is whether international
transactions in stocks and bonds were sufficiently large at the margin to
influence or even to govern prices in the various national markets.
Before turning to an examination of the evidence on that point, two
other important dimensions of international capital movements should be
mentioned, for while they are not strictly part of "capital markets" as
defined here, both short-term capital movements and direct investments pro
vide potential indirect linkages between capital markets to the extent that
there is some substitutability between short- and long-term financial claims,
on the one hand, and between long-term financial claims and real assets on
the other.

Capital markets could be fully integrated in the economically

meaningful sense of price equalization for claims of similar quality even
with no movement of long-term portfolio capital between countries, for in
stance, provided that money and capital markets were tightly linked within
each country and that national money markets were closely linked internationally.
National money markets are linked these days primarily through Euro
dollars, a market in short-term dollar claims located in London and other
European financial centers. Where national exchange regulations permit the
outward movement of short-term funds, those with such funds to invest will
compare their earning opportunities at home with those in Eurodollar deposits,
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and will shift funds accordingly . Even where regulations limit the outward
movement of funds, credit-worth y borrowers will draw funds from the
Euro-dollar market when rates there are more attractive than in their home
markets.

In this way national money markets tend to be tied together.

The Eurodollar market has grown to substantial proportions . At an esti
mated $25 billion of total liabilities by the end of 1968, excluding inter
bank deposits, the Eurodollar market was roughly equivalent in size to the
total money supply in Italy, Japan, or the United Kingdom, and was sub
stantially exceeded only by the money supplies in France and the United
States.

It has shown surprising responsiven ess, moreover, to new demands

placed on it. Switches of borrowers or lenders between the Eurodollar market
and domestic markets can therefore exert a powerful influence on domestic
monetary conditions, and for many countries could in principle largely under
cut monetary policy as an instrument of economic stabilizatio n. This extreme
has not yet been reached, in part because a switch between dollars and local
currencies requires either that the switching party take on an exchange risk
or that he insure against it, e.g. by selling forward the currency he has
purchased.

The presence of exchange risk serves to insulate national money

markets from one another even when all the technical facilities for one in
tegrated market are present.
Direct investment abroad can also provide a link between capital markets.
Recent work on the motivation for direct

investment has rightly

emphasized the exploitatio n of quasi-monop oly powers arising from patents
or other unique technologic al or managerial advantages.

Many direct investors
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borrow in local markets, both to establish credit lines and to hedge against
exchange risks, and this practice suggests that direct investment is not
primarily in response to national differences in long-term bond yields.
Nevertheless, direct investment does usually involve the transfer of funds
from one country to another, and since the early sixties such transfers have
taken place on a substantial scale.
U.S. takeovers of European firms bid up the price of existing assets,
and takeovers for cash shift funds from the U.S. capital market to the
capital or money markets of Europe.

Investments in new plant and equipment

are more ambiguous in their effects, since any flow of funds from the parent
company is accompanied by an increased demand for funds that may more than
offset it, depending on the extent of local borrowing and the size of multi
plier effects. But many international corporations, with access to two or
more national capital markets, are influenced in their source of funds by
relative costs, and hence tend to bring borrowing conditions in national
markets into closer harmony. Direct investment also plays a role in bringing national money markets together, as corporations with temporarily idle
funds place them where the yield-risk combination is most attractive, or
fill short-term cash needs by borrowing in the money market where costs are
lowest.

Indeed, international corporations have been among the major partici

pants both in the Eurodollar market and in the Eurobond market.
In passing, it is of

interest that both the Eurodollar market and the

international bond market were encouraged by the imposition of national con
trols that inhibited the most advantageously situated national market from
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serving an internati onal role.

In 1957 the British commercia l banks were

circumscr ibed in their ability to lend sterling outside the United Kingdom, but
were left free to carry on in other currencie s, so began to accept deposits
and lend in dollars. In 1963 the interest equalizat ion tax effective ly closed
the New York bond market to a large class of foreign borrowers and thereby
generated a demand for issues in Europe, a demand that was greatly augmented
two years later by the voluntary limitatio ns placed on U.S. financing of
direct investmen t abroad.

2.

Interest rates and asset prices
The flow of funds across national boundarie s unquestio nably increased

sharply during the sixties, both absolutel y and relative to internal fildentifia ble internati onal money and capital markets
nancial transacti ons.
thesi developme nts
appeared. But were ~ sufficien t to integrate the national financial markets
in the sense of bringing together prices of similar financial assets?

A

perfect market requires a single price for the same commodity prevailin g
each point in
time. When this condition is not met, markets are to that
everywher e at /
extent fragmente d.
It is difficult to test empirical ly the extent to which we have achieved
integrate d money and capital markets among the major industria l countries ,
since assets in different countries continue to be different in one important
respect:

they are denominat ed in different currencie s. The possibili ty of

changes in exchange rates among the currencie s introduce s an element of risk
which, from the viewpoint of a resident of any particula r country, is not
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present when all assets are denominated in a single currency.
differ in other, less important respects.

The assets also

A comparison of interest rates on

high quality short-term assets and on long-term government bonds nonetheless
reveals a marked tendency toward convergence following the move to currency
convertibil ity by the major European countries in late 1958.

Table 2 shows

that the dispersion around the mean of short-term interest rates for eight
decline in dispersion
The
countries declined substantial ly after 1958.
marked
for long-term bond rates,and except for 1966 the dispersion
was less/
steadily
relative to the mean bond Yield, suggesting some convergence in
declined/
the long-term Cap.ital market as well.

The sharp increase in bond rate dis

persion in 1966 is attributabl e &olely to a 2 percentage point increase in
German bond rates, to 8.4 percent, in. a period in which the German state and
local authorities -were borrowing at an exceptional ly heavy rate and the
Bundesbank tightened credit to dampen total spending. The increase in absolute
and relative dispersion of short-term rates in 1968 is attributabl e to a com
bination of high rates in Britain and France, reflecting doubts about the ex
change rates of their respective currencies, combined with an exceptional ly
low rate in Germany designed both to stimulate capital outflow and to promote
domestic capital spending in the aftermath of the recession generated by ex
cessively tight monetary conditions in 1966.
In addition to coming closer together over time, interest rates showed
a greater tendency to move together th~ough time from 1962 to 1967 than
before, indicating a greater influence of one market on another (Chart 1).
This tendency was reversed in late 1967 and 1968, when a series of exchange crises
disturbed interest rate relationshi ps and induced several countries to impose
tight controls on capital movements.

-12-

Table 2
International Convergence of
a
Interest Rates,
1958 - 1968

Short-termb

Government Bonds C

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Coefficient of
Variationd

Mean

1958

2.86

1.22

.43

4.48

.94

.21

1960

3.37

1.21

.36

4.66

.93

.20

1962

2.96

.95

.32

4.80

•89

.19

1964

.74

.20

5.36

.93

.17

1966

3.66
4.80

.83

.17

5.89

1.13

.19

1968

4.74

1.75

.37

5.97

.81

.14

Source:

Standard
Deviation

Coefficient
of Variationd

a

Average rate for June of indicated year

b

Unweighted mean and standard deviation of 3-month Treasury bill
or call money rates for Belgium, Canada, France, Germany (F.R.),
Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States

c

With maturity in excess of 12 years, for countries listed in
preceding footnote plus Italy and Sweden

d

Standard deviation divided by mean

Underlying data from International Financial Statistics
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Equity prices are more difficult to compare, for European firms= publish
too little financial information to compute price-earnings ratios and other
measures of performance from the perspective of the share-holder. This fact not
only makes analysis difficult, but it also inhibits the effective integration
of the markets for equities.

Indices of share prices do show some sympathetic

movement from country to country, but the movement is not very close and may in
any case reflect broadly sympathetic movements in national economic conditions
more than direct buying and selling links between equity markets. Divergences
in share price movements reflect differences in national economic developments,
such as the German recession in 1966-67, and expected or actual changes
in

exchange rates. For an industrial economy dependent on trade, over-

valuation will weaken profit performance in manufacturing, while devaluation
will improve it.

3.

The Challenge of and Response to Financial Integration
All this evidence points to the conclusion that there has been some inte

gration of money and capital markets during the past decade, but that there is
still a substantial way to go before we can speak of unified markets. Even the
integration that has taken place so far, however, has important implications
for the economies involved. The integration of financial markets limits the
scope for the autonomous pursuit of national policy. This is most obviously the
case for monetary policy, but it is also true for taxation and regulation of
business and for exchange rate policy.
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Consider monetary policy first.

In a world of high capital mobility, a

tightening of monetary conditions, e.g. through open market sales by the central
bank or through higher bank reserve requirements, will serve less to dampen
domestic spending than to attract an inflow of funds from abroad. Similarly,
an attempt to ease domestic monetary conditions to stimulate spending will in
stead simply stimulate an outflow of funds. Financial integration thus poses a
profound threat to the traditional reliance on monetary policy for stabiliza
tion of the domestic economy. The effectiveness of monetary policy for this
purpose is greatly reduced by high capital mobility across national boundaries,
for the rest of the world in effect becomes a residual source of demand for
excess domestic liquidity and a residual source of supply of funds.
By the same to.ken, however, monetary policy becomes very effective as an
instrument for influencing a country's short-run international payments position.
A slight tightening of domestic credit will attract funds from abroad and
thus may be used to finance a payments deficit.

Monetary policy used for this

purpose will be more effective in the short-run than it will in the long,
partly because some of the initial inflow of funds in response to tighter mone
tary conditions will represent stock adjustment of a once-for-all character,
partly because, in the absence of perfect capital mobility, higher interest
charges on outstanding short-term indebtedness must be set against whatever
continuing inflows there are,
An additional implication of increased capital mobility is that fiscal
policy will become more effective at influencing domestic demand.

The monetarist

claim that the impact on aggregate demand of "pure" fiscal action -- changes in
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the government budget position with no accommodating change in the money supply
will be largely if not wholly offset by interest-induced changes if investment
demand ceases to be relevant in a world in which the required change in the
money supply is provided by capital movements to or from the rest of the world.
In the limiting case of perfect capital mobility, the money supply for all but
the largest countries will accommodate any change in aggregate demand at un
changed interest rates without intervention by the monetary authorities. Thus
while the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy will de
cline with increased capital mobility, hence generating a need for alternative
stabilization measures, the effectiveness of fiscal policy at influencing aggre
gate demand will increase.
The weakening of monetary policy for stabilization purposes nevertheless
poses a serious problem for governments, since .it is usually the most flexible
instrument of policy at hand and for institutional reasons it is also more
insulated from short-run political considerations.

Not surprisingly, governments

are loathe to give up their reliance on monetary policy -- indeed, it is not
clear either that they should or that they can, politically speaking -- and they
have therefore taken a number of steps to counteract the integrating tendencies
evident in money and capital markets. These actions in turn make more difficult
analysis of the degree to which money and capital markets have become unified:
the potential unification may be far greater than that actually observed, as
summarized by the data in the preceding sections, because of deliberate counter
veiling steps to reduce the integrating pressures in the interests of preserving
some degree of national autonomy in the exercise of monetary policy.
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Government response to the greater interdependence between national
capital markets has been widespread.

These responses have often been taken

under the guise of balance-of-payments policies, but that is merely the other
side of the coin.

Special measures to restrain capital outflows serve to pro

tect the balance of payments in periods in which for domestic reasons the
monetary authorities desire to maintain a greater degree of monetary ease than
prevails abroad.

That these measures are not governed principally by balance

of-payments considerations is indicated by the fact that countries in payments
surplus have also taken steps to insulate their economies from high international
capital mobility, even though balance-of-payments pressures were not so acute
as for countries in deficit.

The devices used are well known.

Virtually all countries restrict foreign

access to their domestic capital markets, usually on the grounds that unlimited
access by foreigners could create undue disruption of imperfectly developed
national capital markets.

Britain and the United States, however, restrict

access on balance-of-payments grounds, in the case of the United States through
an "interest equalization tax" on U.S. purchases of European and certain other
issues, which is to say that the authorities in those countries would not like
tobe.obliged to maintain interest rates at the levels required to l~nit foreign
borrowing.

Both countries also limit purchases by their residents of out

standing foreign securities.

The interest equalization tax applies in the

United States, and Britain in effect imposes a tax by requiring British resi
dents wanting to invest abroad to buy foreign currency at a premium but to
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sell a portion of receipts from liquidation of foreign assets to the authori
ties at the official exchange rate.

These and other countries also limit the

amount of short-term investment that can be undertaken abroad.
High capital mobility can be as frustrating to countries wanting to tighten
domestic monetary conditions as to those wanting to ease them.

At various

times France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have all prohibited
interest payments on deposits

by foreigners, to inhibit an inflow of short-term

funds. Special reserve requirements have been imposed on foreigners' deposits
with the same aim. Since 1964 Germany has imposed special withholding taxes
on interest paid to foreign holders of domestic bonds, a kind of negative
interest equalization tax.

(Foreign bonds floated in Germany are exempt from

this tax, so they command lower nominal yields and therefore draw funds largely
from outside Germany.)

Both Germany and Italy, and to a lesser extent the

Netherlands and Switzerland, have encouraged their banks to channel shortterm funds abroad through directives or att'ractive forward swap arrangements,
thereby regaining some control over domestic monetary conditions. But this
technique will work only so long as domestic non-bank borrowers do not have
direct access to foreign sources of funds, a condition that has eroded over
time.
International transactions in equities do not escape the national re
straints. The taxes imposed by Britain and the United States apply to equities
as well as to bonds. Several countries limit purchases of foreign equities by
their residents to those quoted on the national stock exchange, which in turn
are restricted. In the late sixties the growth of mutual funds in Europe
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provided a closer link between equity markets, especially in Germany and Italy,
for they permitted residents to purchase balanced and diversified packages of
foreign securities of which they had little direct knowledge.

In 1969, however,

the Italian government limited sharply the activities of these mutual funds,
despite the fact that Italy was running a large payments surplus at the time,
because they were drawing equity funds away from prospective domestic issuers
at a time when the Italian authorities wanted to stimulate domestic investment.
In sum, national authorities do not yet seem ready to accept the limita
tions imposed on their own freedom to influence domestic financial conditions
by an integrated capital market spanning national boundaries.
High internation al mobility of capital also imposes limits on national
autonomy in matters of taxation and business regulation, although these limi
tations are both less obvious and far less evident than is true for monetary
policy.

There is little question 1 however, that one of the principal attrac

tions of foreign bonds to investors is that income on them can be more easily
concealed from the domestic tax authorities .

Foreign bond issues registered

on the London market, unlike domestic issues, are not subject to British withon domestic issues,
holding tax (where tax treaties eliminate British withholding / they also provide for exchange of information between taxing authorities ); but they are not
generally subject to withholding tax by the United States or
other country either .• ·

by any

High internation al

capital mobility under these circumstanc es will erode the ability of national
authorities to tax interest income except in those countries where the tra
dition of voluntary tax compliance is strong, for prospective bond-holder s can
readily invest in internation al bonds to escape taxation.
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High capital mobility also weakens national regulation of securities mar
kets and corporate financial activity.

In early 1969 a Swiss company subverted

a Swiss requirement that existing stockholders be given preference on new stock
issues, for example, by establishing a financial subsidiary

in the Netherlands

Antilles to raise desired funds through a convertible bond issue.

This kind

of escape from regulation through migration was a familiar phenomenon in the
United States around the turn of the century~ where business regulation by the
constituent states was gradually eroded as the railroad and the telegraph
transformed local markets into a national one.

Those states most aggressive

in the competition for business location set a tone for lax business regulation,
and as a result regulatory responsibilitie s were gradually taken over by the
Federal government.
Pressures for supra-national action in the field of business regulation
and taxation have not yet reached an advanced stage, but the beginnings of
such pressure can be seen both in the desire for increased inter-governme ntal
consultation on such matters and in the attempts, largely so far by the United
States, to tax

11

foreign 11 income and to extend its national regulations beyond

n'tional
boundaries. The Revenue Act of 1962 levied U.S. taxes on the income of
U.S.-owned corporations operating from tax haven countries; and the Kennedy
Administration had asked for a much broader extension of the U.S. tax than
that finally passed by Congress. Similarly, in 1965 the Securities and Exchange
Commission instructed a number of foreign (mostly Canadian) companies to submit information reports because their securities were being traded in the over-the
counter market in the United States. The foreign companies regarded this as an
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unwarranted intrusion into their business affairs, and they were supported by
their governemnts; but the SEC was merely carrying out its Congressional manpossible
date to protect American investors from/exploitation by unscrupulous-corporate
management.

The problem of national jurisdiction arose because securities

markets transcend national boundaries.
A third area in which high international mobility of capital has important
implications is exchange rate policy.

A technically well-developed inter

national money market, among other things,facilitates the movement of funds
into or out of different currencies in anticipation of exchange rate changes,
so the volume of currency speculation is greatly enlarged during periods of
uncertainty about exchange parities.

The presence of exchange risk might be

expected to inhibit the development of an international capital market. 1 When
foreign loans are involved, either the borrower or the lender (or both) run
an exchange risk. If the borrower's home currency is devalued, the burden
of a foreign-currency debt will be increased in terms of his own currency.
(Whether the real burden on the borrower is increased by devaluation depends
on a host of other factors as well, such as whether devaluation raises the
profitability of his local investment.)

Nevertheless, financial integration

may proceed rapidly when exchange risk is perceived to be low.

The subsequent

emergence of exchange rate uncertainty will induce many lenders to insure
1. Canadians floated fixed interest bonds in New York (in U.S. dollars)
on a large scale during the 1950s, when the Canadian dollar was on a floating
rate. But expectations (and Canadian monetary policy) kept the Canadian dollar
close to parity with the U.S. dollar. Moreover, Canadian borrowing in New
York increased sharply in the 1960s, after Canada switched to a fixed exchange
rate. How much of the dramatic increase in foreign borrowing was due to factors
other than the change in exchange rate regime is difficult to say.
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against parity changes either

by borrowing or by selling forward,

As the

volume of outstanding internation al indebtednes s increases, the volume of
hedging activity in periods of uncertainty will also increase, resulting in
correspondin g pressure on national reserves, These large and sudden movements
of funds in turn may force reserve-sho rt countries into unnecesaary parity
changes, or, on the contrary, delay needed changes because of the reduction
in national wealth (in the form of loss o·f reserves, implied by a change in
exchange rate when there is a large but temporary short (for devaluation ) or
long (for revaluation ) foreign position in the currency.

4.

The Pros and Cons of an Internation al Capital Market
Tuining now from the analytical and empirical to the normative side, we

may ask whether such financial integration as has taken place is a good ~hing
or a bad thing.

Or to cast the question into policy terms, are the defensive

reactions by governments desirable or undesirable ?

These questions cannot not

be answered sensibly without a point of comparison. What are the alternative s?
On the standard competitive model, a reduction of artificial barriers to capital
movements, whether by reducing ignorance or by removing policy restriction s,
will lead toamore efficient use of the world's scarce resources and hence
would generally be regarded as desirable. The economic theorist's presumption
in favor of free markets is applicable to capital as well as to goods and
services.

Under competitive conditions, capital will seek higher rates of

return, moving from regions of-relative scarcity.

Total output will rise.

addition, free movement of funds permits individuals and institution s to

In
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diversify their risks, and this too is desirable to the extent that individuals
deem high risks to be undesirable.

Thus there is a diversification as well

as an efficiency argument for international capital mobility.
An assessment of the desirability of international capital mobility be

comes more complicated when competitive conditions are not fulfilled, for
example because of the presence of import tariffs or income taxes.

Inter

national capital movements may either mitigate or aggravate the efficiency losses
arising from the tariffs, depending on whether the tariffs raise the return to
capital more in capital-poor countries than in capital-rich ones. Similarly,
different national tax rates may either foster or inhibit the efficient alloca- ·
tion of capital among countries. Tax treaties strive for tax neutrality in
the location of capital. But lower tax rates combined witht2x deferral or
other tax avoidance

devices presumably contribute to better allocation when

they draw American capital to Belgium than when they draw French or Italian
capital to Switzerland, perhaps to be relent to the United States.
Arguments based on ~!locative efficiency assume that economies have ad
justed fully to prevailing conditions.

In particular, they assume that

balance-of-payments equilibrium is assured, so that real capital movements
correspond to non-compensatory private and official movements of funds across
boundaries, and they also assume that the various clm'J'3Stic eco.:1omies respond
quickly and properly to changes in the pattern and level of demand.

Neither

condition is met in practice. The failure of balance-of-payments adjustment to
take place promptly and appropriately, in the short- or even medium~run, may
lead to no more than opposing movements of private and official capital.
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In this case the increased mobility of capital implies a need for additional
international liquidity. But it may instead lead to the imposition of restrictions
on other transactions, introducing resource misallocations or aggravating those
already present; or it may lead to unwanted unemployment or inflation, the
former entailing obvious resource costs and the latter involving costs of a
more subtlf:! sort.

Although international capital movements are not ordinarily

the source of unwanted deflation or inflation, they may inhibit the prompt
correction of excessive deflationary or inflationary tendencies by constraining
the use of monetary policy.

Fiscal policy can in principle fill the breach

left by monetary policy for stabilizing the domestic economy, though not without
occasional help from changes in e,mange rates if balance-of-payments equili
brium is also to be maintained. But if for political or other reasons fiscal
policy is not in fact readily available for this role, the costs of international
capital mobility are correspondingly higher. The United States during the
period 1960-64 perhaps offers the clearest, and certainly the most costly,
case in which high capital mobility inhibited the use of monetary policy to
stimulate a sluggish economy in a period in which fiscal policy could not be
brought rapidly into play.
Finally, the increased international mobility of capital will affect the
distribution of income.

Real capital movements will raise the marginal product

of labor in capital-importing countries and will lower the marginal product
of labor (relative to what it would otherwise have been, except where the
foreign investment has come entirely from increased savings) in capital-ex
porting countries.

Under competitive conditions, labor will be made relatively

better off in the former countries, capital better off in the latter.

Even
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imperfect adjustment of real to financial capital flows will produce these
effects, although to a lesser degree.

In principle, of course, we can

separate efficiency from equity, allow flows to take place on principles of
efficiency, and correct for equity through the tax system. In practice, we
have found great

iifficulty in levying incentive-free taxes, so a clear

separation between the two considerations is not possible. Furthermore, redis
tributional taxation cannot be laid with impunity on internationally mobile
factors, for they can escape taxation through migration or through evasion
permitted by high mobility.

Redistributive taxation relies on fragmented

factor markets to be effective.
A second distributional effect of high capital mobility arises during the
transition to a fully integrated capital market.

Only the best known (and

generally largest) firms and banks can borrow in the major international markets,.
and by shopping around such firms can lower the total cost of their borrowed
funds -- not least because of the lower international bond rates occasioned
by tax evasion. Thus the growing international capital market may foster the
concentration of industry.

(A countervailing tendency, at least during the

trat1Siticnalphaee to full integration, is the invasion of national
markets by new foreign competitors.)
How does one weigh these conflicting considerations in assessing the pros
and cons of an evolution toward an Atlantic capital market?

I conclude such

an evolution is desirable, provided we can coordinate monetary policies
effectively among countries and obtain more active fiscal policies within
countries, and provided we can assure that real capital movements correspond

-26-

closely to net financial flows. An international capital market is no substi
tute for changes in exchange rate parities, and in fact its presence greatly
aggravates the currency speculation that can take place in anticipation of
changes in parities. It thus suggests the need for smaller and more continuous
- changes in exchange rates, which in turn may reduce somewhat the high mobility
of capital,

If balance-of-payments equilibrium is not assured through

coordinated monetary policies and provision for more frequent changes in ex
change rates, however, high capital mobility will exert pressures for trade
controls and/or unwanted domestic inflation or deflation.

Under these circum

stances high international mobility of capital may well leave us with a third
or fourth best world, and governemnts may be

wise to restrict international

flows in the interests of attaining at least a second best one.

